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Abstract 
Recent debates concerning the age of electoral majority in the UK have focused on 
the levels of knowledge and maturity of young people.  However, little research has 
explored the ways in which adolescents orient to these concerns themselves.  In this 
paper we present analyses from a qualitative interview investigation in Northern 
England, and explore the ways in which our adolescent participants treated voting as a 
responsibility which should be exercised on the basis of a rational, autonomous and 
informed decision.  Such arguments were frequently used to argue against a reduction 
in the age of electoral majority.  These findings are discussed in relation to policy and 
educational debates in the UK. 
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Knowledge, autonomy and maturity:  developmental and educational concerns 
as rhetorical resources in adolescents’ discussions regarding the age of electoral 
majority in England. 
 
Political participation is a core requirement for democracy, with scholars and policy 
makes across ‘western’ liberal democracies engaged in a seemingly continual debate 
over how best to involve and enthuse young people in the political process.  The 
present paper explores these issues within a UK context, with a particular focus on 
recent debates concerning the age of electoral majority and the introduction of 
citizenship education in England.  A key focus of these debates has been on the 
educational and maturational readiness of people under the age of 18 to vote, and the 
paper is concerned with how adolescents themselves orient to these educational and 
developmental matters as they debate the possibility of lowering the age of electoral 
majority. 
 
Young people and political participation in the UK 
Debates regarding young people’s levels of political participation have been ongoing 
for several years in the UK (see e.g. Coughlan 2003, Sloam 2007, Tonge 2009, 
Vaizey 2005, Youth Citizenship Commission 2009a), with some commentators noting 
that recent concerns are simply the latest in a long line of moral panics over young 
people’s engagement with democratic processes (see e.g. Cowley and Denver 2004).  
Many studies point to low levels of interest and engagement in politics amongst 
young people (e.g. Park 1999, 2004, Park et al. 2004, White et al. 2000), and a 
weakening of ties to political parties in an era characterized by increasing 
individualism (Sloam 2007). These trends, together with falling turnout amongst 
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young adult voters at recent general elections (Henn and Weinstein 2006, Kimberlee 
2002)
1
, have led to the oft-noted trope of ‘apathy’ being used to characterise young 
people’s relationship with politics (O’Toole et al. 2003).  For others, the relatively 
low rate of political participation amongst young people is unsurprising given what 
Jefferys (2007, p. 281) has termed the ‘anaemic’ political culture of the UK as a 
whole.  This perhaps reflects a normative Anglo-British
2
 culture of liberal 
individualism, which some authors have suggested instils a sense of ‘passive’ 
citizenship leading to reluctance to participate in political process (see Condor and 
Gibson 2007, Marquand 1991). 
 
Debates concerning the age of electoral majority in the UK 
A focal point for many of the debates concerning young people’s political 
participation in the last decade has been the age of electoral majority, which currently 
stands at eighteen years of age (see e.g. Cowley and Denver 2004, Curtice 2004, 
Dawkins and Cornwell 2003, Folkes 2004, Wing Chan and Clayton 2006).
3
  A 
number of groups and organizations (e.g. UK Youth Parliament, Votes at 16) have 
begun to argue for a reduction in the age of electoral majority to enable young people 
to vote from the age of sixteen, and the issue has been considered in several official 
reports intended to inform the work of policymakers (e.g. Youth Citizenship 
Commission 2009b, Electoral Commission 2004; for a summary see White 2009). 
A related development was the introduction in 2002 of Citizenship Education 
into the school curriculum in England for children aged 11-16, following the report of 
the Advisory Group on Citizenship (1998), chaired by Bernard Crick, and known 
informally as the Crick Report (see also Qualifications and Curriculum Authority 
2007a, b).  Although the citizenship curriculum is not overly prescriptive – schools 
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can, for example, teach citizenship in separate classes or integrate it into other 
subjects – the aims of Citizenship Education, as laid out in the Crick Report, have 
been to increase levels of social and moral responsibility, community involvement 
and political literacy (Advisory Group on Citizenship 1998).  As Condor and Gibson 
(2007) noted, the Crick Report was introduced as a direct attempt to effect a ‘change 
in the political culture of this country both nationally and locally’ (Advisory Group on 
Citizenship 1998, p. 7; see also Lopes et al. 2009).  Several contributors to debates 
regarding the age of electoral majority have suggested that the embedding of 
citizenship education in the school curriculum provides further grounds for extending 
the franchise to 16 and 17 year olds.  For example, the ‘Votes at 16’ coalition argues 
that ‘[l]owering the voting age to 16 would allow a seamless transition from learning 
about voting, elections and democracy to putting such knowledge into practice’ 
(Votes at 16 2008, p. 10; see also Power Inquiry 2006).  Similarly, many 
commentators note that lowering the age of electoral majority might lead to an 
increase in young people’s levels of political participation.  For example, reflecting on 
the results of their focus group study of young people’s engagement in politics, White 
et al. (2000, p. 44) suggested that ‘the lack of opportunities for young people to 
engage in the political process until the age of 18 ... contributed to low levels of 
political interest.’ 
It is perhaps unsurprising that many of these debates regarding young people’s 
political participation have been played out against a backdrop of more general 
educational and developmental concerns regarding the appropriateness of different 
forms of education, the rate at which young people mature and acquire knowledge, 
and so on.  For example, Wing Chan and Clayton (2006) review a range of data 
regarding young people’s attitude stability and consistency, their interest in politics 
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and their levels of political knowledge, and conclude that 16 and 17 year olds have 
typically not reached sufficient levels of maturity to merit a vote.  This points to the 
centrality of ‘maturity’ in these debates (see also White 2009) with a number of 
commentators on both sides of the argument seemingly in agreement that the age at 
which one can vote should be set at a point at which the majority of individuals can be 
considered able to make a mature and responsible decision (see e.g. Electoral 
Commission 2004, Wing Chan and Clayton 2006). 
However, despite the volume of research exploring young people’s political 
participation, few studies have explored how adolescents themselves discuss the 
possibility of lowering the age of electoral majority, if and how they invoke education 
and maturity in these discussions, and what commonsense assumptions regarding 
political participation underscore such discussions.  These issues are of central 
importance as without such a consideration there is a risk of policy and academic 
debate occurring in an empirical vacuum which fails to pay attention to young 
people’s own constructions of the objects of political and scholarly concern.  It is the 
aim of the present study to undertake such an analysis, and it does so by adopting an 
approach informed by rhetorical psychology. 
 
Rhetorical Psychology 
Rhetorical psychology (Billig 1991, 1996, Billig et al. 1988) is a member of the wider 
family of discourse analytic approaches which have been developed in social 
psychology over the last two decades or so (e.g. Edwards 1997, Edwards and Potter 
1992, Potter 1996, 2007, Potter and Wetherell 1987, Wetherell and Potter 1992).  
These approaches are characterised by a broadly social constructionist 
epistemological framework which emphasises the construction of reality (including 
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psychological entities) in discourse.  In the present paper our specific concern is with 
the use of rhetorical commonplaces.  Billig (1996) traces the notion of the 
commonplace from the classical study of rhetoric and its concern with the topoi or 
topics of argumentation.  In contrast to some classical uses of ‘topic’ which treat it as 
referring to the form of arguments, Billig (1996, p. 228, italics in original) identifies 
another meaning which is more concerned with the content of arguments:  ‘In talking 
of the content of arguments, the rhetorical textbooks often referred to the ‘common-
places’ (loci communes) of arguments.’  Billig (ibid.) goes on to suggest that ‘the 
concept of common-places is an interesting one, in that it stands for the common-
sense values and notions, which ideally should be shared by speaker and audience 
alike.’  Here, we follow Billig’s concern with using the content of argumentation as a 
way of studying socially shared commonsense assumptions. 
In recent years discursive and rhetorical approaches have been used to study a 
range of issues relating to citizenship (e.g. Abell et al. 2006, Barnes et al. 2004, 
Hopkins et al. 2003, Condor 2006a, Condor et al. 2006, Gibson 2009, Gibson and 
Condor 2009; see also Condor 2011).  Of particular relevance for the present study is 
Condor and Gibson’s (2007) analysis of accounts of political participation amongst a 
sample of 18-24 year olds in North-West England.  Condor and Gibson pointed to the 
ways in which their interviewees could position themselves as responsible citizens by 
virtue of their non-participation, with technical knowledge frequently being treated as 
superior to rights to opinionation in legitimating political participation.  Notably, 
Condor and Gibson suggest that, for their participants, ‘the very fact that ‘politics’ 
constituted a curriculum subject could be viewed as good reason to cast political 
decision making as a technical matter, best left to those with the highest levels of 
formal qualification and training’ (2007, p. 133).  This raises the question of how, 
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precisely, adolescents under the age of 18, who are currently participating in 
citizenship education classes, might orient to these matters.  In the present paper we 
therefore present an analysis of discussions of political participation and the age of 
electoral majority amongst young people who have undergone several years of formal 
citizenship education. 
 
Method 
Participants 
The participants consisted of 174 young people (71 males, 103 females) aged from 14 
years and three months to 17 years and three months (M = 15 years 6 months), who 
were all in UK school years 10 (N = 117) and 11 (N = 57), which are currently the 
final two years of compulsory schooling in the UK.
4
  Pupils from eight schools, all of 
which were located in the north of England, participated in the research.  Schools 
were sampled using a combination of convenience and purposive sampling, with the 
purposive element involving an effort to sample schools from both the private (fee-
paying) and state (publicly-funded) sectors.  Six were state schools, with the 
remaining two being private.  Fifty-four participants attended one of the private 
schools, and 120 attended one of the state schools.  Data were collected on parental 
occupation and although this information was not intended to be used to classify 
participants according to socio-economic status, it reveals a wide range of 
occupational backgrounds.  Using the UK Office for National Statistics’ (2010) socio-
economic classification system as a rough guide, parental occupations ranged from 
those consistent with the definition of ‘routine occupations’, to those consistent with 
the ‘higher managerial and administrative’ and ‘higher professional’ occupations.  
  
9 
 
Participants recruited from private schools tended to be from households where at 
least one parent would be classified in these latter categories. 
It should be noted that whereas state schools are bound by the National 
Curriculum and therefore Citizenship Education is compulsory, this is not the case for 
private schools.  However, both private schools involved in the research taught 
Citizenship Education.  The schools were located in areas which are relatively 
homogeneous in terms of ethnicity, and as such all but four participants indicated their 
ethnic background as ‘White British’ on a standard tick-box ethnicity monitoring 
form.  Two participants indicated their ethnic background as ‘White British and other 
white background’, one selected ‘Chinese’ and one selected ‘other mixed 
background’. 
 
Interviews 
In order to generate discussion between participants, a group interview method was 
employed.  Sixty-two semi-structured group interviews were conducted on school 
premises between March 2006 and November 2007.  Each interview was conducted 
by a single researcher, with each participant taking part in only one interview.  Initial 
interviews were conducted with group sizes of two to four participants, although as 
the research progressed we increasingly sought to recruit participants in groups of 
three wherever possible as this generated more discussion than groups of two, and 
allowed individual participant voices to be picked out more easily for transcription 
purposes than when participants had been interviewed in groups of four.  Seventeen 
interviews involved two participants, 40 interviews involved three participants, and 5 
interviews involved four participants.  Interview duration ranged from 19 minutes to 1 
hour and 22 minutes (M = 43 minutes). 
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 The interviews were intended to generate discussion on a range of issues 
related to citizenship, such as military service, employment, environmental issues, 
immigration, political participation, social inequality and European integration.  
Seven principle questions were presented in turn on A4-sized cards, and participants 
were invited to discuss the issues covered by each question.  Although the interviewer 
had a series of possible prompts and follow-up questions that could be used if 
necessary, participants were allowed to direct the discussion to their own areas of 
interest.  The present paper focuses in detail on discussions of political participation, 
and specifically of electoral participation, which followed from the presentation of 
one question card in particular:  ‘Should the age at which you can vote in elections be 
reduced from 18 to 16?’ All data analysed for the present paper were drawn 
exclusively from discussions following the presentation of this question card (for 
analyses of other aspects of the data, see AUTHOR REFS). 
 
Analytic Procedure 
Initial selection of data for analysis involved the extraction of all material 
relevant to the question concerning the reduction in the age of electoral majority.  
These data were then read with a view to identifying the rhetorical commonplaces 
employed within arguments for and against a reduction in the age of electoral 
majority.  These commonplaces were evidenced in the interview discussions through 
the use of a range of specific terms.  For example, although the term ‘maturity’ was 
itself often used by participants, more colloquial references to ‘growing up’ were also 
used, and where contextually appropriate, these were identified as being part of 
rhetorical commonplaces based around maturity.  This stage of the analysis involved 
repeated reading of the data, and we aimed for over-inclusion by including borderline 
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cases in the analysis (Potter & Wetherell 1987).  We subsequently returned to these 
borderline cases in order to clarify whether they did in fact exemplify the rhetorical 
commonplace which had been identified.  We then undertook a broader review of the 
rhetorical commonplaces identified in order to ensure that earlier readings of the data 
had not unduly constrained subsequent readings.  This involved the comparison of 
instances of commonplaces with each other, and with instances of different 
commonplaces (both between and within interviews). 
In order to further ensure a robust analysis, we used deviant case analysis (see e.g. 
Seale 1999, Silverman 2006), a technique recommended by a number of discursive 
and rhetorical researchers (e.g. Taylor 2001, Wiggins & Potter 2008).  This can be 
understood as a qualitative approach to falsification insofar it requires the analyst to 
actively seek out apparently atypical cases in order to ensure that emergent findings 
which fail to account for all relevant data are either modified or rejected.  Similarly, 
we endeavoured to adopt a suitably reflexive approach in our analysis (see e.g. Taylor 
2001), in particular in relation to the treatment of the interviews as a specific form of 
situated social interaction.  Reflexivity involves the turning of the analytic gaze on the 
analyst.  In practice, this entailed paying attention to the contributions of the 
interviewer in the interactions as well as to the responses of the interviewees.  Thus, a 
cornerstone of our analysis was something frequently neglected in social scientific 
research using interviews or focus groups – that the constitutive nature of the research 
encounter was key to forming the resultant accounts.  However, whereas some 
discourse analysts have recently argued against the use of interviews as a method of 
data collection on the grounds that the constitutive nature of the interview context 
precludes drawing conclusions other than (e.g. Potter & Hepburn, 2005), we sought to 
analyse our data both in terms of its production in the specific social setting of the 
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interview, and as an occasion for the mobilization of the broader ideological and 
cultural currents (i.e. commonplaces).  We thus sought to follow Wetherell’s (2003, p. 
13) argument that although ‘[t]he interview is a highly specific social production, : : : 
it also draws on routine and highly consensual (cultural/normative) resources that 
carry beyond the immediate local context, connecting local talk with discursive 
history.’ 
 Although our analytic approach is a qualitative one, we do present basic 
frequency information in order to demonstrate the prevalence (or otherwise) of 
particular commonplaces within our dataset.  Again, this can be seen as a strategy for 
ensuring the robustness of our analysis insofar as it allows us to demonstrate the 
prevalence of the rhetorical commonplaces identified across the sample.  It should be 
noted that in doing this, we report the number of interviews in which a particular 
rhetorical commonplace was used (out of a total of 62), rather than the number of 
participants who used it.  This is because, following the arguments of authors such as 
Shotter (1993) and Condor (2006b), it was apparent that rhetorical commonplaces 
were invariably jointly produced and therefore any attempt to attribute ‘ownership’ to 
particular individual participants would risk neglecting the complexities of the 
dialogical character of interaction. 
 
Analysis 
By far the most common position on the issue of lowering the age of majority was 
opposition (N = 47), with a smaller proportion of the interviews featuring arguments 
in favour of the move (N = 25), and a single interview featuring an argument for the 
age of majority to be increased.  Analysis suggested that a common set of rhetorical 
resources were being deployed by the participants regardless of the particular position 
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they argued regarding the lowering of the age of electoral majority.  The key 
assumption in most discussions revolved around the requirement for voting to be 
based on a rational and informed choice.  Related to this were concerns about 
knowledge/education (N = 35), maturity (N = 25) and autonomy (N = 20), which 
often co-occurred in the same interview.  These concerns constituted rhetorical 
commonplaces insofar as it was typically assumed that rational and responsible voting 
was contingent upon the prior establishment of a mature and autonomous viewpoint, 
grounded in sound political knowledge. 
The following summary of the analysis is organised into three sections.  First, 
we will show how these commonplaces could be drawn upon by participants arguing 
for different positions in the debate.  Second, we will explore how formal educational 
experiences could be mobilised in the discussions.  Third, we will explore in more 
detail the use of commonplaces of autonomy and maturity. 
 
Arguments for and against lowering the age of electoral majority 
In extract 1 we see a fairly typical example of the rhetorical mobilization of 
knowledge and autonomy to argue against lowering the age of electoral majority: 
 
Extract 1: 
1 Craig:  “Should the age at which you can vote in elections 
2   be reduced from eighteen to sixteen?” 
3 Claire:  No. 
4 Sharon: No, because at sixteen you don’t know- 
5 Claire:  Because when you’re sixteen you don’t have 
6   a clue what you’re doing. ((laughs)) 
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7 Sharon: Yeah, exactly you’re sixteen you’re not old 
8   enough to know. 
9 Claire:  You- you don’t know politics and stuff. 
10 Craig:  I don’t know, if I could have voted, I wouldn’t 
11   have voted for Tony Blair. 
12 Sharon: I wouldn’t have done.  Because you’ve got your 
13   parents that are influencing you into a decision. 
14   When you’re eighteen your decision is yours - 
15 Amy:  I don’t know why they’d reduce it to sixteen. 
16 Claire:  You’re a free person when you’re eighteen. 
17   Your mind’s your own. 
18 Sharon: But when you’re sixteen you’ve got TV that’s 
19   influencing you, your parents, your friends – it’s 
20   not your own choice.  When you’re eighteen 
21   you’re allowed to make your own choice. 
 
Sharon and Claire both explain their immediate replies of ‘no’ with reference 
to 16 year olds’ lack of knowledge (ll. 3-9).  Craig’s response that he would have 
voted against Tony Blair had he been able to (ll. 10-11) occasions a change of 
rhetorical strategy from Sharon and Claire, who move from the ‘lack of knowledge’ 
argument to draw instead on the autonomy commonplace, referring to parental and 
other forms of social influence (ll. 12-13, ll. 18-20), and explaining that this is no 
longer the case when one reaches the age of eighteen, at which time ‘you’re a free 
person’ (l. 16) and ‘the decision is yours’ (l. 14). 
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These commonplaces were also frequently drawn upon in arguments for 
lowering the voting age, for example: 
 
Extract 2: 
1 Hugh:  “Should the age at which you can vote in 
2   elections be reduced from eighteen to 
3   sixteen?” 
4 Jackie:  Yeah  
5 Leslie:  Yeah. 
6 Jenny:  I thought it was sixteen. 
7 I:  Why do you think it should be? 
8 Jackie:  Cos at sixteen that’s – 
9 Leslie:  Cos everyone should have a say shouldn’t they. 
10 Jenny:  Should be allowed our own, opinions. 
11 Jackie:  At sixteen, it’s like the age where you get, the 
12   legal age for like full time jobs and that, so you’re – 
13   and then, you’ll start having to pay tax, if you 
14   get a full time job and paying over a certain 
15   amount, but yet you won’t get a – but you don’t 
16   get a say in, who you – to elect. 
17 Jenny:  Yeah. 
18 I:  Yeah. 
19 Jackie:  I think it’s a bit tight, I mean you’re putting enough 
20   in, to like – 
21 Jenny:  And you’re like, when you’re sixteen you’re 
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22   growing up aren’t you, it’s not as if you’re still, 
23   like going to be stupid about it, cos it’s something 
24   serious really isn’t it? 
 
Leslie and Jenny work up a rationale for their agreement with the lowering of 
the age of electoral majority based on equal rights to opinionation (ll. 9-10), and 
Jackie argues that because 16 year olds can enter employment and pay taxation they 
should therefore ‘get a say in who … to elect’ (ll. 11-16).  Arguments that the range 
of other legal rights and responsibilities accorded to 16 year olds meant that they 
should also be granted suffrage were also present in other interviews where 
participants argued in favour of lowering the age of majority (N = 5).  However, such 
arguments were rarely offered in isolation, and here Jenny subsequently attends to an 
unstated objection that 16 year olds might not be capable of voting by asserting that at 
sixteen ‘you’re growing up’ and are therefore not ‘going to be stupid about it, cos it’s 
something serious’ (ll. 21-24).  Here, we see political participation oriented to as a 
responsibility which is not to be taken lightly, and which is a ‘serious’ matter 
requiring ‘grown up’ participation. 
 It can therefore be seen that, regardless of the particular position argued on the 
question of the age of majority, the participants treat voting as a responsibility which 
requires knowledge and is not to be treated frivolously. 
 
Knowledge and education 
The observation that these young people frequently treated knowledge as a pre-
requisite for suffrage follows Condor and Gibson’s (2007) finding that their sample of 
18-24 year old young adults could often treat formal political knowledge as a criterion 
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for political participation, and that this led to an image of a population composed of 
members who are differentially qualified for political participation.  In the present 
study, the possibility of formally assessing political knowledge could be raised as a 
solution to the problem of variation in levels of political knowledge amongst 16 year 
olds.  For example: 
 
Extract 3: 
1 Tim:  “Should the age, at which you can vote in elections 
2   be reduced from eighteen to sixteen?” 
3 Rob:  No. 
4 Tim:  No, I don’t think it should. 
5 Rob:  I don’t think you have the er same, knowledge 
6   about it all when you’re sixteen.  Like I – if I was 
7   doing it, now – well June, so a couple of months’ 
8   time when I become sixteen, I wouldn’t, I wouldn’t 
9   have a clue. 
10 Tim:  You’d just be ticking a box, wouldn’t you? 
11 Rob:  Yeah, you’d like – you’d pick the same one that 
12   your dad picked or something like that, yeah. 
13 I:  Yeah. 
14 Tim:  Erm (3) I don’t know, I think a lot of people 
15   don’t – don’t know – you ask any – a lot of 
16   sixteen year olds won’t even know what elections 
17   are. 
18 I:  Yeah? 
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19 Tim:  So I think it’s daft to – 
20 Rob:  Or the different parties or anything like that, they 
21   wouldn’t have a – 
22 Tim:  And not all eighteen year olds vote do they? 
23 I:  Yeah. 
24 Tim:  So. 
25: I:  Do you think – 
26 Tim:  Maybe if you say you can vote, like, do a quick 
27   amplitude ((sic)) test so you can tell who they are 
28   or something daft. 
 
Rob illustrates the insufficient knowledge of 16 year olds by constructing himself as 
not ‘hav[ing] a clue’ (ll. 5-9).  Tim’s assertion that 16 year olds’ voting would amount 
to ‘just ticking a box’ draws on a commonplace in which a vote not based on some 
informed rationale was treated as effectively meaningless.  Rob and Tim go on to 
invoke the prospect of parental influence (ll. 11-12) and a lack of knowledge about 
elections and political parties (ll. 14-17, 20-21), before Tim points out that not all 18 
year olds vote (l. 22).  Tim then suggests that a formal test to assess suitability to vote 
might be administered (ll. 26-28), although he orients to this as ‘daft’. 
 In many respects, of course, this ‘daft’ suggestion represents the logical 
conclusion of many of these young people’s arguments that at sixteen, people are not 
generally knowledgeable enough to be entrusted with voting rights.  As noted, such 
arguments create an impression of a differentially politically qualified populous, who 
might therefore be differentially entitled to political rights (Condor and Gibson 2007).  
Similar arguments were present in many interviews, with some participants arguing 
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that the capacity for responsible political participation was dependent upon formal 
educational experiences.  For example: 
 
Extract 4: 
1 Vicky:  And a lot of like, a lot of people, are like aren’t, 
2   don’t, really get involved with political matters 
3   at our age, a lot of people don’t have time for it, 
4   and so, they, they wou- might feel like they have 
5   to vote but, they wouldn’t know what to vote for 
6   they wouldn’t, understand people’s policies and- 
7 Sophie: Mm 
8 I:  Yeah 
9 Lilly:  Whereas at eighteen, I dunno, if you, might grow 
10   up studying law and you want to go and do 
11   something then maybe you would have more of 
12   a, kind of law what am I on about, I dunno, 
13   politics and s- yeah 
14 Vicky:  Economics yeah 
15 I:  Yeah 
16 Lilly:  Then you might have more of an idea whereas at 
17   sixteen you’re kind of, you don’t really know 
18   much about, parliament … 
 
In this extract, Vicky predicates a lack of political involvement on the part of 
people ‘our age’ not on immaturity, but on a lack of time, which leads to a deficit in 
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understanding and knowledge (ll. 1-6).  Lilly then follows this up by suggesting that 
by the time one reaches eighteen, one may have studied law (subsequently corrected 
to politics and, by Vicky, economics), and that by virtue of this ‘you might have more 
of an idea’.  In contrast to Vicky, Lilly does link educational experiences to 
maturity/adulthood with the reference to ‘grow[ing] up’ (ll. 9-10).  The guiding 
assumption appears to be that political participation should be undertaken responsibly, 
and that such responsible participation requires a certain level of knowledge, which in 
this case can be gained by studying politics and economics. 
Similarly, when participants did make claims to political knowledge they were 
often predicated on particular educational interests or experiences: 
 
Extract 5: 
1 I:  So d’you feel now at sixteen like you’d like to 
2   vote or you could vote and you think y- 
3 Sarah:  I think I’d need, I think I need a bit more time, 
4   just because some stuff I don’t even know what 
5   I think about, what I think yet so 
6 Louise: I don’t, I don’t know enough about politic-, 
7   politics at all to vote 
8 I:  Mm 
9 Louise: I don’t, it would be a waste of a vote to be honest 
10 Sarah:  Yeah 
11 Chloe:  I dunno, cos I know quite a lot cos my brother 
12   does politics and I’m doing politics next year 
13 Sarah:  Mm 
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14 Chloe:  and it’s like quite an interesting 
15 I:  Mm 
16 Chloe:  thing for me, but I wo- I don’t think, I wouldn’t 
17   vote cos there’s some- 
18 Louise: I find it interesting but I just wish I knew more 
19   about it 
20 Sarah:  I think it’s really interesting, but ((inaudible)) yeah 
21 Louise: I really think we should be taught, more about it 
22   when we’re younger 
 
Of interest in this extract is the way in which two speakers, Chloe and Louise, 
mobilise education in their arguments.  Sarah’s initial response to the question 
concerning whether they ‘feel’ they would ‘like to vote’ or ‘could vote’ mobilises a 
lack of knowledge of her own opinions (ll. 4-5: ‘I don’t even know what I think 
about…’).  Louise then follows this up with an explicit statement concerning her lack 
of knowledge about politics (ll. 6-7) and that, as a result, her vote would be ‘a waste’ 
(l. 9).  Again, we may note how the assumption here is that voting that is not well 
informed is without merit.  In contrast to her colleagues, however, Chloe positions 
herself as knowing ‘quite a lot’, and this is accounted for by virtue of her brother’s 
studies, and her own plans to study politics ‘next year’ (ll. 11-12).  She states that ‘it’s 
… quite … interesting’ before going on to say that, despite this, she would not vote.  
As she is explaining this, Louise interjects to assert that ‘I find it interesting’, which 
serves to challenge Chloe’s apparent elision of knowledge and interest, which 
potentially carried with it the implication that Louise, in claiming to lack knowledge 
about politics, was simply not interested in politics.  Louise explicitly dissociates the 
two concepts by suggesting that although she finds it ‘interesting’, she wishes she 
  
22 
 
‘knew more about it’ (ll. 18-19).  At this point Sarah also asserts that she finds it 
‘really interesting’ (and note the upgrade here from Chloe’s ‘quite … interesting’ and 
Louise’s ‘interesting’).  Following the logic of Chloe’s argument, Louise then states 
that she thinks more formal education in these matters is needed, thereby accounting 
for her lack of knowledge as stemming from a lack of formal education on the subject, 
for which she is not responsible. 
 Despite their differential claims to knowledge, both Chloe and Louise 
rhetorically invoke formal education in their arguments.  For Chloe, formal education 
provides the grounds for her claim to ‘know quite a lot’, whereas for Louise the 
absence of formal education is invoked to mitigate against her claim to lack 
knowledge about politics being treated as evidence of a lack of interest in politics. 
Although in most interviews participants treated knowledge levels as a matter 
of either individual differences (e.g. extract 3, ll. 26-8) or as characteristic of their age 
group as a whole (e.g. extract 1, ll. 4-9), in one deviant case political knowledge was 
linked to the type of educational establishment one attends.  However, this case 
nevertheless still exemplifies the basic underlying assumptions of rationality as a pre-
requisite for voting: 
 
Extract 6: 
1 Steph:  … Erm, “Should the age at which you 
2   can vote in elections be reduced from 
3   eighteen to sixteen?” Well hasn’t the 
4   ((inaudible)) erm hasn’t Gordon Brown 
5   already been talking about this? 
6 Tiffany: Mmm. 
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7 I:  Yeah. 
8 Steph:  Erm, I think, erm, it depen- it – it – I think it just, 
9   depends on, how educated you are.  Cos some 
10   sixteen year olds like, who go to a private 
11   school like we do, I think we’d have a better 
12   un- understanding of – than people – cos I know 
13   some pe- I used to go to a state school, and um 
14   (2) I just don’t – they’re not half as, like, cle- 
15 Tiffany: They’re not interested in it.  I used to as well. 
16 Steph:  Yeah they’re not interested that’s it. 
17 Tiffany: Mm. 
18 Steph:  They don’t really care, and so therefore they 
19   don’t really want to say anything, and they 
20   don’t really want to, know about anything. 
21 Tiffany: You know they’d just abuse their power you know 
22   they’d all group up and vote for some stupid thing, 
23   and if everyone does that, who are like that then it 
24   would just you know – 
25 Steph:  I think it’s better if it stays at eighteen. 
 
Steph’s initially equivocal response to the question of a reduction in the age of 
electoral majority again draws on the importance of knowledge, and links this to 
formal educational experiences, but she predicates suitability for political 
participation explicitly on the type of school one has attended.  Positioning herself as 
a member of a private school-attending in-group (ll. 10-11:  ‘sixteen year olds … who 
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go to a private school like we do’), she suggests that access to this form of education 
leads to greater ‘understanding’ than state school education.  At this point Steph’s talk 
is marked by a number of false starts, hesitations and qualifiers, all of which are 
associated with ‘delicate’ talk, such as when a speaker is orienting to the possibility 
that their talk may be construed as indicative of prejudice (van Dijk 1984).  She 
further attends to this by claiming experiential grounds for entitlement to speak about 
the issue (l. 13:  ‘I used to go to a state school’, see Pomerantz 1984).  As Steph 
struggles to finish her turn (l. 14), Tiffany completes and summarizes Steph’s 
positional statement by saying ‘They’re not interested in it’, before also attending to 
her entitlement to make such a claim by declaring that she also used to attend a state 
school  (l. 15).  The use of ‘interest’ is again notable here as it avoids the overt 
implication that people who attend state schools are not as intelligent as those who 
attend private school.
5
  Steph then offers an agreement and re-statement of Tiffany’s 
‘interest’-based summary (l. 16), and re-formulates state school pupils as not caring 
about politics, which ultimately leads to them not wanting to ‘know about anything’ 
(ll. 18-20).  Tiffany then upgrades the critique of state school pupils by suggesting 
that they would ‘abuse their power’ by acting collectively to ‘vote for some stupid 
thing’.  The danger of allowing those with an inferior level of education to vote is 
therefore grounded in the spectre of ill-informed voting en masse.  This line of 
argument may be atypical of the current dataset, but it exemplifies the common 
underlying assumptions that voting should be undertaken responsibly (some stupid 
thing), autonomously (all group up) and that it should be based on an informed choice 
(a better … understanding). 
 
Autonomy and maturity 
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Having explored in some detail the various ways in which knowledge and education 
could be invoked in arguments concerning the age of electoral majority, we now turn 
our attention more specifically to the closely related commonplaces of autonomy and 
maturity.  To begin with, consider extract 7, in which autonomy and maturity are 
invoked as alternatives to knowledge as criteria for electoral majority: 
 
Extract 7: 
1 Adam:  “Should the age which you can vote in elections 
2   be reduced from eighteen to sixteen?”  (1)  I think, 
3   no. 
4 Grace:  Yeah 
5   (1) 
6 Tim:  Yeah I think it (0.5) it could be quite good.   
7 Adam:  Mm 
8 Grace:  I think like, lots of people have, strong views 
9   about it so why aren’t, why can’t their views be 
10   (1) heard or whatever. 
11 I:  Heard yeah. 
12 Adam:  When you’re sixteen you’re- not really mature 
13   enough. 
14 Grace:  But saying that when you’re, sixteen or seventeen 
15   you don’t really know about the, about like the, 
16   the money side of it or the- 
17 Adam:  Yeah like you could- 
18 I:  I’m sure there are plenty of older people who 
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19   don’t really know 
20 Grace:  Yeah 
21 I:    their economics and things like that. 
22 Tim:  It should be more when you’re, like living 
23   alone, or when you’re kind of more independent. 
24 Grace:  Yeah I suppose so. 
25 Adam:  Yeah it’s like, you don’t really want, understand 
26   and you’re not mature enough to make a decision 
27   like 
28 I:  Yeah 
29 Adam:  you could be forced into making a decision, not 
30   like make your own decision. 
 
In this extract we can see the participants resolving a dilemma between 
knowledge and participation (Billig et al. 1988) by jointly constructing a criterion 
based around independent living, which is linked to maturity.  Grace and Tim both 
indicate support for lowering the age of majority, with Grace predicating this on rights 
to political participation based upon opinionation (ll. 8-10).  However, Adam invokes 
maturity to strike a more cautionary note (ll. 12-13), and this is taken up by Grace 
who marks her shift in argument (l. 14: ‘But saying that…’) before moving on to 
invoke a lack of knowledge regarding ‘the money side of it’ (ll. 14-16).  The 
interviewer’s turn at lines 18-21 is important here as the suggestion that ‘there are 
plenty of older people who don’t really know … their economics’ challenges the 
knowledge deficit argument as grounds for opposing a reduction in the age of 
electoral majority.  It is in this context that Tim and Adam jointly construct an 
  
27 
 
argument against lowering the age of majority based around autonomy (ll. 22-23), 
understanding and maturity (ll. 25-26), with Adam suggesting that one might be 
‘forced into making a decision’ (l. 29). 
 The notions of autonomy/independence used by participants sometimes 
reflected Tim’s concern in extract 7 that electoral majority should be contingent upon 
physical separation from the familial home (‘living alone’) which could be treated as 
enabling one to experience the ‘realities’ of self-sufficiency.  However, more 
commonly this reflected a lay socio-psychological theory of social influence and 
development whereby 16 year olds’ lack of knowledge and understanding was treated 
as likely to lead to them following their parents’ lead.  For example: 
 
Extract 8: 
1 Eleanor: … if you look at erm, the sixteen as an 
2   average (0.5) the age sixteen as an average 
3   most people won’t understand politics or 
4   what’s going on.  And they’ll just be voting 
5   as their parents are voting, which is not an 
6   individual’s vote … 
 
 Similarly, the way in which maturity was used varied, with some participants 
(such as Adam in extract 7) invoking universal patterns of maturation to suggest that 
people would be more capable of responsible political participation at eighteen, 
whereas others invoked maturation as part of a rhetorical strategy based around the 
construction of notions of individual difference: 
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Extract 9: 
1 Luke:  “Should the age at which you can vote in elections 
2   be reduced from eighteen to sixteen?” 
3 Gabby: No. 
4 Luke:  Yeah. 
5 I:  No, yes. 
6 Luke:  No, I mean no.  I meant no. 
7 I:  You meant no ((laughs)) 
8 Luke:  Cos it’d just get really silly and people would just 
9   be doing it as a joke. 
10 I:  Right. 
11 Gabby: Yeah.  I think some people are mature enough to 
12   do it but not like- 
13 I:  some people what sorry? 
14 Gabby: Are mature enough 
15 I:  Mature enough. 
16 Gabby: to decide stuff like that but, I mean, most people 
17   aren’t really. 
18 Luke:  Like, I'll vote for him he's got a funny name or 
19   something like that 
20 Gabby: ((laughs)) 
21 Luke:  I just ((laugh)) I don't, well, l- 
22 James:  Gordon Brown, that’s the colour of my jumper 
23   I’ll vote for him. 
24   ((all laugh)) 
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25 Luke:  Yeah I- I just don’t think, well some people are 
26   but some people will not be mature enough and 
27   just, really ((laughs)) could screw up the country, 
28   to be honest. 
 
Gabby asserts that ‘some people are mature enough’ to vote at sixteen (ll. 11-
12) but suggests that most are not (ll. 16-17).  Her fellow interviewees illustrate the 
potential consequences of a reduction in the voting age through a series of exemplars 
of ‘joke’ voting (ll. 8-9, 18-19, ll. 22-23), before Luke suggests that such ‘silly’ and 
immature voting could actually carry serious consequences (l. 27:  ‘screw up the 
country’).  Once again, in the critique of ‘just’ treating voting ‘as a joke’, these 
participants orient to voting as a serious responsibility, one that should be treated with 
due respect given the consequences it might have for ‘the country’.  Rhetorical 
strategies which involved the construction of individual differences in maturation can 
be understood in terms of their rhetorical function as concessions (Antaki and 
Wetherell 1999).  Note in extract 9 how Gabby (l. 11; ll. 16-17) and Luke (ll. 25-28) 
both structure their argument in the form of some people are mature enough to vote 
but….  In this respect, then, we might suggest that these interviewees are attending to 
the possibility that categorical statements concerning the levels of maturity of all 16 
year olds might themselves be received as unwarranted, and potentially irrational, 
generalizations. 
It is notable that the invocations of maturity in the present data resonate with 
the concerns of those academics, policy makers and other commentators involved in 
the debates around the age of electoral majority.  In this respect, the participants 
appear to be drawing on a series of culturally available commonplaces surrounding 
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political participation in which voting requires an autonomous, informed, mature and, 
above all, responsible decision.  It is equally notable that this image of the ‘model 
voter’ could be constructed not only by participants arguing in favour of suffrage for 
16 and 17 year olds, but also by those adolescents who were themselves arguing 
against a reduction in the age of electoral majority.  Such arguments therefore 
depended, somewhat paradoxically, on these young people demonstrating an 
orientation to precisely those norms of responsibility and rationality that they argued 
were beyond themselves and/or their peers. 
 
Discussion 
Participants in the present study oriented to voting as a responsibility requiring an 
informed decision that should be exercised independently from parental or peer 
influences.  Above all, participants treated voting as something that required rational, 
mature and responsible participation, and this assumption permeated the discussions 
regardless of the actual position being argued (e.g. for or against lowering the age of 
electoral majority). 
These findings suggest that the commonsense assumptions found amongst a 
sample of 18-24 year olds by Condor and Gibson (2007) also represent the taken-for-
granted background against which this younger sample discussed the age of electoral 
majority.  Ultimately, participants in both studies treated political participation as 
requiring rational and responsible involvement, with the corollary that it would be 
more responsible for anyone incapable of meeting these requirements not to 
participate.  The present study extends these findings by demonstrating the use of 
these arguments in a younger sample who have undergone at least three and a half 
years of formal citizenship education.  Moreover, it highlights the ways in which 
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participants perform rationality and responsibility in arguing that they, and their peers, 
are not sufficiently rational and responsible to be trusted with political rights. 
In many respects, then, the assumptions underpinning the arguments identified 
in the present research echo much of the formal institutional discourse of citizenship 
education and related policy debates regarding political participation and the age of 
electoral majority.  Of particular note is how closely these arguments appear to reflect 
some of the values enshrined within formal Citizenship Education policies.  For 
example, Crick (2007, p. 236) argued that ‘[d]emocracy is a necessary element in 
good government but not a sufficient one, unless subjective opinion is enshrined over 
knowledge’, and it is clear that the adolescents interviewed in the present research did 
indeed base their arguments on the assumption that political participation should be 
well-informed.  However, these young people often drew on these commonplaces in 
order to argue against their own involvement in the political process.  It might 
therefore be speculated that attempts to encourage young people to see themselves as 
‘active citizens’ capable of political participation, may in fact reinforce the 
availability of a culturally powerful set of arguments against young people’s political 
participation. 
As has been noted before (Electoral Commission 2004), such arguments can 
themselves be understood as essentially mature and responsible.  It is not the aim of 
the present study to draw conclusions regarding these young people’s ‘actual’ levels 
of maturity or responsibility, but it is, nevertheless, worth noting that the cultural-
communicative competencies evidenced by the deployment of these rhetorical 
commonplaces points to a fundamental sense in which these young people are already 
competent members of a political culture of non-participation (see e.g. Jefferys 2007).  
However, the finding that these commonplaces are mobilized by a sample of 
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adolescents who have undertaken several years of formal citizenship education lends 
credence to the suggestion that citizenship education, far from beginning to change 
the political culture of the UK, may in fact risk exacerbating the very aspects of that 
culture that it set out to change. 
This study also highlights the advantages of adopting a constructionist 
epistemological approach and treating, for example, claims to lack knowledge not as 
more-or-less straightforward reports of ‘actual’ lack of knowledge, but as rhetorical 
strategies which can be used to accomplish specific social actions in particular 
contexts.  In this instance, we see how the young people interviewed could, for 
example, invoke a lack of knowledge as grounds to excuse themselves from the 
prospect of political participation.  We should also be cognizant of the local 
interactional function of such formulations.  In the context of the research interview, it 
is worth considering that in positioning themselves as lacking in relevant political 
knowledge, the participants were attending to self-presentational concerns when faced 
with a social science researcher asking questions on a range of political issues.  
Specifically, it is likely that the location of the interviews on school premises made 
educationally-bound identities, such as pupil identity, omni-relevant (Sacks 1992), 
regardless of their actual invocation at any given point in the interview.  In this 
respect, then, we might suggest that claims to lack knowledge represented a more 
general strategy of positioning the self as still under instruction, yet-to-complete-
education – a strategy which ultimately manages one’s own accountability for one’s 
lack of knowledge (see extract 5 above). 
This draws our attention to the limits of generalizability from the present 
study.  The geographical and cultural location of the sample is highly specific, and 
further research is necessary to assess the use of these, and other, rhetorical 
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commonplaces. Moreover, the continually evolving nature of citizenship education 
(see e.g. Ajegbo et al. 2007) might mean that, as institutional discourses evolve, so 
the discursive resources which form the cultural commonsense of young people 
change too.  Furthermore, although the substantive topical focus of the present study 
has been on voting, numerous authors have pointed out that this is only one of a 
variety of ways in which young people might be engaged in the political process (e.g. 
Haste and Hogan 2006, Marsh et al. 2007, Pattie et al. 2004, Weller 2007).  Clearly, 
further research is needed to extend the application of the approach outlined here to 
the analysis of adolescents’ commonsense conceptions of other modes of political 
participation. 
To conclude, it is interesting to note that the conception of autonomous 
personhood assumed by these young people reflects precisely the variety of Western 
individualism that has been critiqued within the social sciences for several decades 
now (e.g. Bauman 2001, Gergen 1999, Gilligan 1982, Sampson 1993).  Such 
individualism sits particularly uneasily alongside the observation that, for the most 
part of the twentieth century, voting patterns within the UK tended to follow trends 
based particularly around class (see e.g. Anderson and Heath 2002, Anderson et al. 
2006).  It might therefore be time to re-orient official institutional discourses of 
citizenship education to emphasise the impossibility of genuine autonomy as 
commonly understood, and of the validity of social influence in arriving at a decision 
regarding where to place a cross on the ballot paper.  It may be necessary to assert the 
inevitability of making a decision based on only the vaguest grasp of the relevant 
‘facts’.  If young people (or indeed any people) are given the impression that they 
have to wait until they are fully autonomous and in possession of sufficient 
‘knowledge’ before they can engage with the political process, then politicians, social 
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scientists and media commentators alike should not be bemoaning the current state of 
political participation, but marvelling that anyone participates at all. 
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Footnotes 
1  
The decline in turnout amongst young voters appears to have recovered somewhat at 
the 2010 election (Ipsos MORI 2010).
 
2 
 Given the empirical focus of the present paper on Northern England, this discussion 
of political culture, participation and the age of electoral majority focuses on the 
English context.  Evidence points to differing political cultures in other parts of the 
UK (see e.g., Condor and Abell 2006), which it is not within the scope of the present 
paper to consider. 
3
  The Isle of Man, Jersey and Guernsey have all reduced the age of electoral majority 
to 16 (see White 2009), but these territories are technically not part of the UK. 
4
  The eldest participant (17 years 3 months) was older than the usual age for year 11 
pupils, but was catching up with missed time due to personal circumstances. 
5
  Although somewhat speculative, it seems reasonable to suggest that the unfinished 
particle ‘cle-‘ (l. 14) may well have been the first syllable of ‘clever’. 
 
